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 INFORMATION ACQUISITION DURING A DUTCH AUCTION
PAAVO MIETTINEN
Abstract. In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (de-
scending price) auction when the bidders that are uninformed of their valu-
ations with probability q and can acquire information about their valuation
with a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information ac-
quisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in the
setting where bidders are ex ante symmetric and have independent private
values. We show that when the number of bidders is large the Dutch auction
produces more revenue than the ﬁrst price auction.
The theory of auctions usually assumes that the bidders know their valuations
for the object to be auctioned. However, there are many instances where this may
not be the case: When a venture capitalist is trying to sell a business that it owns it
is not immediately clear how much the company is worth for a potential buyer. In
addition, if the venture capitalist is unable to sell the company to some set of ﬁrms
with a given price, he is pushed to lower the price that he asks (or refrain from
selling). A lower price may attract the interest of some additional ﬁrms. Firms
that were not initially interested in the company may want to assess how much
the company is worth for them as the price is lowered. Similarly a company that
contemplates entering into a takeover battle for one of its rivals must ﬁrst evaluate
how much the rival ﬁrm is worth.
Levin & Smith (1994) take up the question of endogenous entry in auctions. In
their model the bidders have to incur a positive cost in order to participate into the
auction. By paying the participation cost the bidders also learn their valuations
for the object. After the bidders have decided about participation the number
of participants is made common knowledge. The object is then auctioned to the
participating bidders. In a symmetric equilibrium the bidders mix with respect
to their decision to participate into the auction. Once the number of participants
is known bidding follows the regular equilibrium behavior in the corresponding
auction.
When a static auction is in question this approach is ﬁne, as there is only one
round of bidding. In a dynamic auction, such as a Dutch or an English auction,
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1the decision to participate can also be made during the auction. That is, if the bid-
ders are allowed to participate into the auction after it has started. The example
involving a venture capitalist above ﬁts into this kind of a situation. Another exam-
ple, that shares the descending nature of prices, is the After-Christmas sales. The
sales typically start with a speciﬁc discount percentage. The discount percentage
is then increased as the sales proceeds.
1 These examples suggest that participa-
tion decisions during the auction deserve attention for reasons that are not purely
theoretical.
In this paper we study the bidding and information acquisition behavior in the
following setting: There are N bidders that can be active in the auction. Each
bidder knows his valuation with probability q. Each initially uninformed bidder
may become informed by incurring a cost of c > 0. We assume that every bidder,
informed or not, is allowed to participate into the auction. That is, a bidder may
bid for the object even if he is not informed.2 We study the Dutch auction where
we assume that each uninformed bidder can decide the price at which he acquires
information. If the object is not sold before the ”information acquisition price” the
bidder becomes informed about his valuation and incurs the cost c. The bidder
may then end the auction immediately, or wait for the price to descend further.
We assume that the bidders’ decision to acquire information is covert. Hence
each bidder only knows the number of potential competitors. At any given time a
bidder does not know how many other bidders have already acquired information
or how many other bidders were initially informed.
We consider the case where the bidders have independent private values. We
solve for the symmetric equilibrium in the Dutch auction. In equilibrium the unin-
formed bidders mix with respect to the price at which the information is acquired.
The bidding is determined by a pure strategy (conditional on the acquired infor-
mation). We then compare the revenues that the ﬁrst price auction and the Dutch
auction produce when the number of bidders grows large. We show that in this
case the Dutch auction produces larger revenue than the ﬁrst price auction.
Related literature.
Papers that are most related to the issue of information acquisition during the
auction are by Bergemann & V¨ alim¨ aki (2005), Compte & Jehiel (2007), Rezende
(2005). Compte & Jehiel (2007) consider information acquisition during an ascend-
ing price auction. They allow for information acquisition at any point during the
auction in a setting where each bidder has a chance of being informed about his
valuation. They show that the ascending price auction can generate higher rev-
enue than the second price sealed bid auction. The setup of this paper coincides
with the one analyzed by Compte & Jehiel (2007). Rezende (2005) also studies an
1This year the sales after Christmas in some of Finland’s department stores started with 40
percent discount. The discount increased up to 70 percent towards the end of January. The sales
for clothing for example, typically involves many items and is not an exact match to the model
presented here unless only one item remains in store. However, two features are in common: 1.)
the price for the goods in the sale descends 2.) the buyers must incur the cost of inspecting if
their size is left in the store.
2The analysis remains the same when c is interpreted as the cost of participating and becoming
informed if it is assumed that the seller does not disclose any information about the number of
participants and no uninformed bidding takes place in the equilibrium. If in equilibrium there
are uninformed bidders who bid without information acquisition c cannot be interpreted as the
participation cost.
2ascending price auction, but in his model the bidders have initial estimates about
their valuations and they may learn their exact valuation during the auction. He
assumes that the bidders’ initial estimates provide statistical information about
their true valuation. Additionally, Rezende assumes that the cost of information
acquisition is private information and that other bidders’ drop out points are not
observed before the auction ends, contrary to the paper by Compte and Jehiel.
He characterizes the equilibrium information acquisition strategy and shows, like
Compte and Jehiel, that the ascending auction is revenue superior (in some cases)
to the second price auction.
Bergemann & V¨ alim¨ aki (2005) survey the literature on information and mech-
anism design and they emphasize the importance of further work on sequential
information acquisition in dynamic auctions. Other related work on information
acquisition in static auctions and mechanism design are by Milgrom (1981), Per-
sico (2000) and Bergemann & V¨ alim¨ aki (2002). Both Milgrom (1981) and Persico
(2000) study a situation where the decision to acquire information is made before
any bidding takes place. Milgrom (1981) studies the incentives to acquire informa-
tion in a second price auction while Persico (2000) studies the incentives that the
ﬁrst price and second price auctions provide for information acquisition. Berge-
mann & V¨ alim¨ aki (2002) study a general mechanism design problem and ask when
it is the case that a mechanism provides ex-ante eﬃcient information acquisition
incentives and implements the eﬃcient outcome ex-post.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we ﬁrst introduce the model. We
then proceed constructively to determine the equilibrium bidding strategies and
check that the incentive compatibility conditions are satisﬁed. Section 2 works out
an approximation for the revenue diﬀerence between the Dutch auction and the
ﬁrst price sealed bid auction. We then show that the Dutch auction produces more
revenue than the ﬁrst price auction when n is large enough. Section 3 concludes.
1. The model
There are n ≥ 2 bidders with i.i.d. valuations θi, generically denoted by θ. The
valuations are distributed on [0, ¯ θ] according to an absolutely continuous distri-
bution function F(·) with a density f(·). Each bidder knows his valuation with
probability q > 0. Hence the number of informed bidders is binomially distributed.
The bidders who do not know their valuation may acquire information about their
valuation by incurring a cost c > 0. The uninformed bidders know that their ex-
pected valuation is v =
 
xf(x)dx. We assume that the bidders cannot distinguish
between the uninformed and informed bidders. That is, we assume that the infor-
mation acquisition is covert. We analyze the Dutch auction where the auctioneer
begins with a high asking price which is lowered until some participant announces
his willingness to buy the object at the current price. This participant wins the
auction and pays the current price. We assume that the uninformed bidders can
acquire information at any price during the auction.
A sketch of the Dutch auction equilibrium. To get a ﬂavor of the equilibrium
it is useful to ﬁrst consider the uninformed bidders’ information acquisition behavior
which can be divided into three phases:
At phase 1 the price is high (above some ¯ p) such that no information acquisition
takes place.
3At phase 2 the price reaches a point where information acquisition starts. Infor-
mation acquisition takes place over an interval of prices (p, ¯ p) and all uninformed
become informed at some price on the interval.
At phase 3 no further information acquisition takes place.
The bidding behavior in the three phases is the following:
At phase 1 only informed bidders with high valuations bid.
At phase 2 only the bidders that become informed and observe that their valuation
is above a threshold valuation bid the price at which they acquired information. If
the valuation is below the threshold the bidders wait.
At phase 3 all bidders compete with strategies that are similar to the ﬁrst price
auction.
We argue that the information acquisition must take place over an interval of
prices. Consider what happens if the information acquisition were to take place
at a speciﬁc price. If the price is ”low” the informed bidders have an incentive to
bid slightly before the price, since competition intensiﬁes after the price is reached.
If the price is ”high”, the uninformed bidders have an incentive to wait for others
to acquire information ﬁrst and acquire information if the price descends enough.
This carries the information that the other bidders’ valuations are not high and
that the chances of winning the auction are good. On the other hand if the auction
ends soon after the information acquisition price the bidder who decided to wait
saves the information acquisition cost. Therefore, in equilibrium, the information
acquisition price is decided by mixing over an interval of prices.
Since the information is acquired over an interval, it means that the problem
that the informed agents face changes when the price arrives to the information
acquisition range. This is because the amount of potential competitors increases.
The equilibrium that we derive builds on the existence of a threshold valuation
w∗. The bidder with this valuation is indiﬀerent between bidding any price over
the mixing interval. When the price is in the mixing interval, a bidder with a
valuation higher than w∗ wants to buy immediately and a bidder with a valuation
lower than w∗ wants to wait for the price to descend. Notice also that there is a
gap in the informed bidders bidding that corresponds exactly to the mixing interval
of the uninformed bidders. Our assumptions guarantee that all bidders are willing
to acquire information in the auction. Therefore, in equilibrium, it is common
knowledge that all bidders are informed once the price has reached the lower bound
of the mixing interval.
To ease the notation in the paper we denote by ˜ G(x) = (qF(x) + 1 − q)n−1 and
by G(x) = F(x)n−1. The corresponding density functions are denoted by ˜ g(x) and
g(x). The interpretation of the ˜ G(x) is the following: In phase 1 the competing
bidders are either informed and have valuations below x - with probability qF(x) -
or they are uninformed - with probability 1−q. Similarly the interpretation of G(x)
is that in phase 3 all bidders - who in equilibrium are informed - have valuations
below x. With these observations as our guide we now proceed to construct the
equilibrium.
The Dutch auction equilibrium strategies. Let us start with deﬁning a func-
tion ua(p) that gives the expected value of becoming informed (for free) and having
the opportunity to buy the object at price p.
4u
a(p) =
  ¯ θ
p
(θ − p)f(θ)dθ.
We need to assume that the information acquisition cost c is not too large:
Assumption 1. The information acquisition cost c > 0 satisﬁes
c < u
a(v). (1)
Let us deﬁne w∗ as a threshold valuation that satisﬁes c = ua(w∗). Assumption
1 guarantees that w∗ exist and that v < w∗.
The constructed equilibrium of this paper builds on the assumption that the cost
of information acquisition is small enough to allow for all the uninformed bidders
to acquire information in equilibrium.3 It can be shown that this assumption is
satisﬁed when n becomes large. There may be other reasons as to why remaining
uninformed is not attractive such as an auction having an entry fee as in Levin &
Smith (1994).
We next start to construct the equilibrium strategies. Let us deﬁne
u(θ, ˆ θ) =
  ˜ G(ˆ θ)(θ − ˜ β(ˆ θ)), for ˆ θ ≥ w∗
G(ˆ θ)(θ − β(ˆ θ)), for ˆ θ < w∗
as the utility of an informed bidder with valuation θ that behaves like an informed
with a valuation ˆ θ. Also deﬁne U(θ) = u(θ,θ). For θ < w∗ the bidding strategy is
fully determined by U(0) = 0 and for θ ≥ w∗ the bid function is determined up to a
constant K. It is straightforward to derive and check that incentive compatibility
is satisﬁed4 for the bid functions ˜ β,β that are deﬁned by
˜ β(θ) =
  θ
0 x˜ g(x)dx + K
˜ G(θ)





,if θ < w∗.
Let’s then turn to the uninformed bidders’ strategies and consider the value of





  ¯ θ
w
u(θ,w)f(θ)dθ − c ˜ G(w). (2)
From the ﬁrst order condition for equation (2) while observing that ∂
∂wu(θ,w) =
(θ − w) ˜ G′(w) we get a condition for the threshold valuation:
  ¯ θ
w
(θ − w)f(θ)dθ = c, (3)





can check that when w∗ > v the inequality holds for n large enough. We elaborate on what happens
when this assumption is relaxed in the discussion that follows the equilibrium characterization.
4See e.g. Krishna (2002).
5which is can be satisﬁed by Assumption 1 for w = w∗. The uninformed that acquires
information optimally at β(w∗) gets
E[min{U(θ),U(w∗)}] + ˜ G(w∗)
   ˆ θ
w∗
(θ − w∗)f(θ)dθ − c
 
= E[min{U(θ),U(w∗)}].
Now the information acquisition starts at ¯ p = ˜ β(w∗) and it must also end at some
p .5 The indiﬀerence condition for type w∗ allows us to pin down the lower bound to
p = β(w∗). We next need to ﬁnd an information acquisition strategy that ensures
that information acquisition at any price on (p, ¯ p) yields E[min{U(θ),U(w∗)}].




   ¯ θ
w∗






n−1(w∗ − p)(1 − F(w∗)), (4)
where the probability Q(p) =
 
qF(w∗) + (1 − q)(F(w∗) + H(p)(1 − F(w∗)))
 
is
composed of three events. Either the uninformed is faced with an (initially) in-
formed bidders with θ ≤ w∗ - with probability qF(w∗) - or with uninformed bid-
ders with valuations θ ≤ w∗ - with probability (1 − q)F(w∗). Finally the com-
peting bidders may be uninformed and have valuations θ > w∗ - with probability
(1−q)(1−F(w∗))H(p). Equating (10) with E[min{U(θ),U(w∗)}] allows us to solve
for H(·) and obtain
H(p) =
qF(w∗) + 1 − q
(1 − q)(1 − F(w∗))






(1 − q)(1 − F(w∗))
. (5)
Using the fact that H(p) = 0 and p = β(w∗) we can solve for ¯ p and get that
¯ p =





Finally the indiﬀerence condition ˜ β(w∗) = ¯ p allows us to pin down the constant of




˜ G(x) − G(x)dx.
We have just constructed the following equilibrium strategies.
Proposition 1. The following strategies constitute a symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the Dutch auction.
• The informed bidders choose the amount they bid according to
˜ β(θ) =
  θ
0 x˜ g(x)dx + K
˜ G(θ)





,if θ < w∗,
5Information acquisition cannot continue to p = 0. This would necessitate either a mass point
at zero or a guaranteed utility of zero to the uninformed bidders.




˜ G(x) − G(x)dx.
• The uninformed bidders choose the price p at which they acquire informa-
tion from an interval [p, ¯ p],according to the distribution function
H(p) =
 







(1 − q)(1 − F(w∗))
,
with the property that H(p) = 0 and H(¯ p) = 1. After information is ac-
quired the (un)informed bid according to the informed bidders’ strategy. If
the information acquisition price p is such that ˜ β(θ) ≥ p then the unin-
formed bidder bids p.
The incentive compatibility for the informed bidders when competing against
other informed bidders is a standard proof. The incentive compatibility for the in-
formation acquisition follows our assumption that information acquisition is always
preferred to staying uninformed. It remains to show that the informed have no prof-
itable deviations and that the same applies to the uninformed bidders’ information
acquisition strategy. We prove these with the following two lemmata.
Lemma 1. The informed have no proﬁtable deviations on p ∈ (p, ¯ p).
Proof. Consider the expected utility of an informed bidder θ at price p ∈ (p, ¯ p).
This is given by
Q(p)
n−1(θ − p) = ˜ G(w∗)




where we have substituted for H(·). Now it is immediate that the expected utility
is constant if θ = w∗. It is also immediate that the expected utility is increasing in
p if θ > w∗ and decreasing if θ < w∗. The initially uninformed bidders with θ > w∗
want to bid in immediately once they obtain information about their valuation,
since their expected utility decreases when the price decreases. Conversely bidders
with a valuation θ < w∗ want to wait for the price to descend as their expected
utility increases when the price decreases. It is also clear from this analysis that
the critical type w∗ is unique.6 ￿
Lemma 2. The uninformed have no proﬁtable deviations from the information
acquisition strategy.
Proof. Suppose that the uninformed acquires at a price β(θ′) < β(w∗) which implies
that θ′ < w∗. Then using equation (2) and the deﬁnition of c allows us to compute
W(w∗) − W(θ′) =
  w∗
θ′
U(θ) − u(θ,θ′)f(θ)dθ +




  ¯ θ
w∗










6If θ′ > w∗ were the critical type, then the expected utility would decrease as the price increases
conversely to the assumption of being a critical type.
7since U(θ) − u(θ,θ′) ≥ 0 by the incentive compatibility of the bidding functions.
Then consider when the uninformed acquires at a price ˜ β(θ′) > ˜ β(w∗) which implies












  ¯ θ
θ′
u(θ,θ′)f(θ)dθ +




  ¯ θ
w∗













(θ − w∗)f(θ)dθ ˜ G(θ′)
+
  ¯ θ
θ′
(U(w∗) − u(w∗,θ′)f(θ)dθ.



































˜ G(θ′)dx + (θ − w∗) ˜ G(θ′)
 
f(θ)dθ = 0.





Discussion. How signiﬁcant is the assumption that all bidders have an incentive
to acquire information in equilibrium? For some parameter values7, an equilibrium
can be constructed where there are essentially three kind of bidders: The (initially)
informed bidders, the uninformed bidders that decide to acquire information and
the uninformed bidders who decide to bid without acquiring information. In equilib-
rium the uninformed bidders ﬁrst decide whether they want to acquire information
or to bid ”blind-folded”. The ﬁrst two phases are analogous to the ones presented
in this paper. In the third phase the informed compete with each other until the
price descends enough to incentivize the uninformed bidders to join the bidding.
At the fourth phase the uninformed bidders that decided to bid blind-folded mix
with respect to the price that they are willing to bid. Finally there is a ﬁfth phase
where all bidders are informed and compete in the same fashion as in the ﬁrst price
7It may also be the case that no information acquisition takes place in equilibrium for some
parameter values. In this case the equilibrium takes the same form as in the ﬁrst price auction.
We elaborate this in the omitted proof section.
8auction. This phase is attained only in the event that all bidders have become
informed during the auction and observe that their valuations are low.8
We next spend a few lines to analyze the setup used in this paper. In the
Dutch auction the uninformed bidders may postpone their information acquisition
decision. This allows them to measure the level of competition prior to acquiring
information. As the uninformed observe that the price descends the information
acquisition becomes more attractive. A lower price implies that the competitors’
valuations are drawn from an interval with a lower upper bound and hence the
competitors’ valuations are also smaller in expectation. Lower price also implies
that the probability that the uninformed bidder has the highest valuation increases,
which is good news for the uninformed. Note that this is in contrast with what is
observed by Rezende (2005) in the context of an ascending auction. In his model
the bidders do not observe the number of remaining bidders either. It is bad news
for the uninformed to observe a price increase in the ascending auction, since it only
conveys the information that it is less likely that his valuation is the largest among
all bidders. In the ascending price auction, where the number of remaining bidders
is not observed, no information about the intensity of competition is available to
the (uninformed) bidders.
In the ﬁrst price auction it is not possible to defer information acquisition. In
fact, information acquisition quickly becomes unattractive, when the number of
bidders increases. Miettinen (2010) analyzes the equilibrium bidding behavior in a
ﬁrst price auction with a large number of bidders. The main reason why the bidding
functions diﬀer in the two auctions is that the competition intensiﬁes sooner in the
Dutch auction than it does in the ﬁrst price auction. In the Dutch auction the
bidders know that the competition intensiﬁes as the uninformed bidders start to
acquire information.
9 In the ﬁrst price sealed bid auction the uninformed bidders
start bidding later than in the Dutch auction. Therefore, for a ﬁxed number of
informed bidders, the competition is less intensive in the ﬁrst price auction.
We highlight this feature with the example in the ﬁgure below. Here the valua-
tions are uniformly distributed and we graph the bidding functions for the informed
bidders. The uninformed bidders’ mixed strategies ”ﬁll the gaps”. I.e. the mix-
ing takes place on the interval where the informed bidders’ bid function jumps.
Therefore, the distribution of bids has no gaps in it.
8It can be showed that if q = 0 then the equilibrium takes a form where all bidders initially
use a mixed strategy to decide the price at which they acquire information. The structure of
the equilibrium is similar, but there is no phase 1 where the informed bid prior to information
acquisition.
9Note also that in a regular setting with independent private values, the bidders learn nothing
about their opponents during the auction. Here, the bidders learn that all of their opponents are
informed, if price descends below p.



























 c = 0.02
 n = 8
 q = 0.5
 w = 0.8
Notice that the ﬁrst price auction bid function goes above the Dutch auction bid
function for a small range of values. However, the Dutch auction bid function stays
above the ﬁrst price auction bid function once they have crossed.
10 On an intuitive
level this implies that the revenue from the Dutch auction is larger than from the
ﬁrst price auction when the number of bidders is large enough. This is because
with a large number of bidders the probability mass assigned to the events where
the Dutch auction bids are above the ﬁrst price auction bids converges to unity. At
the same time the mass that is assigned to the events where the ﬁrst price auction
bids are above the Dutch auction bids becomes very small. We now address this
issue formally.
2. The revenue
The Dutch auction revenue. To compare revenue from the Dutch auction with
the revenue obtained from the ﬁrst price auction we make the following observations.
In the ﬁrst price auction (with a reserve price v) 11 the rent for the agent with





10If n = 2 in this example, the Dutch auction bid function never crosses the ﬁrst price auction
bid function. However, with n = 3 the crossing occurs.
11It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium bid function in the ﬁrst price auction






˜ G(θ) . Here we consider a ﬁrst price auction
where the seller has a reserve valuation of v. We use this approach since we compare revenues
from the two auction formats when the number of bidders is large. In this case the incentive
to acquire information disappears in the ﬁrst price auction and in equilibrium the uninformed
bidders bid without information acquisition. However, this bidding take place at prices below v
and comparison between the Dutch and the ﬁrst price auction becomes cumbersome. To overcome
this diﬃculty we approximate the revenue from the ﬁrst price auction (from above) with the use
of reserve price at v. A more detailed derivation of the equilibrium strategies can be found from
the omitted proofs section.
10and in the Dutch auction for θ > w∗ by
















and results in a gap between the rent that the informed bidder with type θ > w∗ gets
in the ﬁrst price and in the Dutch auction. The fact that the uninformed acquire
information when the price gets low pushes rents down by a constant amount for
all informed types above w∗. Therefore the seller is better of by ∆ with probability
1 − ˜ G(w∗).
With probability ˜ G(w∗) − G(v) all informed have θ < w∗ but at least one un-
informed learns that θ > v. Then the seller cannot be worse oﬀ by more than
v − β(v).
Finally with probability G(v) all types are below v and the seller loses at most
v.
Hence the revenue diﬀerence between the Dutch and the FPA is approximated
by
− vG(v) − ( ˜ G(w∗) − G(v))(v − β(v)) + (1 − ˜ G(w∗))∆, (6)
where v −β(v) =
R v
0 G(x)dx
G(v) . We now show that this diﬀerence becomes positive for
n large enough.
Proposition 2. The revenue from the Dutch auction is larger than the FPA rev-
enue for large but ﬁnite n when q ∈ (0,1).
Proof. It is clear that all the terms in (6) converge to zero when n increases without
bounds. We need to be sure that the negative terms converge faster than the
positive ones. Let’s rewrite the expression for revenue diﬀerence as
A(n−1)
      
−vG(v) − ˜ G(w∗)
B(n−1)






G(x)dx + (1 − ˜ G(w∗))
 
C(n−1)
         w∗
v
˜ G(x) − G(x)dx
 
11The rates of convergence for these terms are
A(n) − A(n − 1)
A(n − 1)
=F(v) − 1,


































v ( ˜ G(x) − G(x))dxq(F(v) − 1)
C(n − 1)
= q(F(v) − 1),
where the ﬁst inequality for the term C(n − 1) holds for large n. Since the rate
of decrease for ˜ G(x) is q(F(x) − 1) and slower than the rate of decrease for G(x)
which is (F(x) − 1). So we have that ˜ G(x)q > G(x) for n large. We disregard the
analysis for the positive term ˜ G(w∗)
  v
0 G(x)dx.
Since ˜ G(x) > G(x) for all x when q ∈ (0,1) the term C(n−1) is always positive.
It is clear that q(F(v) − 1) > F(v) − 1, so the term A(n − 1) converges faster
than C(n − 1). Finally comparing the convergence speed of B(n − 1) to C(n − 1)
notice that as n increases the multiplier ˜ G(w∗) of B(n − 1) decreases while the
multiplier (1− ˜ G(w∗)) of C(n−1) increases. By treating the multipliers as constants
we approximate the respective multipliers of B(n − 1) upwards and of C(n − 1)
downwards. Now we need that










which always holds. Therefore as n becomes large enough we have that
−vG(v) − ( ˜ G(w∗) − G(v))(v − β(v)) + (1 − ˜ G(w∗))∆ > 0.
￿
Our analysis of the Dutch auction assumes that the information acquisition is
instantaneous. This means that there is no delay between the information acquisi-
tion decision and the time when the information is received. In some cases it may
be argued that information acquisition takes time. Compte & Jehiel (2007) show
how to amend the ascending auction to account for the delay in the information
acquisition. It is not immediately clear how, if at all, the Dutch auction could be
modiﬁed to account for the delay in the information acquisition without altering
the equilibrium strategies.
3. Conclusion
In this paper we’ve examined the bidding behavior in the Dutch auction with
independent private values. Some bidders may be uninformed about their valua-
tions and acquire information during the Dutch auction. We solve for equilibrium
12strategies and show that the Dutch auction produces more revenue to the seller
than the ﬁrst price auction, when the number of bidders is large.
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13Omitted Proofs
The ﬁrst price auction equilibrium strategies. We reproduce the analysis for
the ﬁrst price auction equilibrium strategies from Miettinen (2010). We focus on the
case where the number of informed bidders is so large that information acquisition is
an undesirable option for the uninformed bidders.12 That is, the cost of information
acquisition is larger than the expected payoﬀ for an uninformed bidder who knows
that there can be up to n−1 informed bidders in the auction. This means that the
uninformed bidders choose their bids through a mixed strategy.13 Note that the
problem for the informed bidders is similar to what the informed bidders face in
the Dutch auction. The only thing that is diﬀerent is the constant of integration.
The proof for this proposition can be obtained from the previous section by setting
σ = 0.
Proposition 3. The following strategies constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
the ﬁrst price auction, when the information acquisition for the uninformed is too
costly.14 The bidding function for the informed bidders is given by
ˆ βFPA(θ) =
  θ
0 x˜ g(x)dx + ˆ K
˜ G(θ)





,if θ < v,




˜ G(x) − qn−1G(x)dx. The uninformed bidders use a mixed strategy over













Proof. Again we skip the proof that the bidding functions satisfy incentive com-
patibility. If there are uninformed bidders in the auction, then the winning price
is always above ˜ p. This implies that, in equilibrium, the bidders that have valu-
ations below v never win the auction unless all bidders are informed. Therefore,
conditional on a bidder with valuation v having the highest bid, he knows that
all other bidders must be informed and have valuations below v. Therefore, the
bidders with valuations below v bid according to the regular FPA auction where
all bidders valuations are in [0,v].
We now show that the mixing takes place according to the proposed J(·) and
that there are no proﬁtable deviations for the informed or uninformed on (˜ p, ˆ p). We
12We formalize this assumption below.
13Suppose that there is a price q at which all uninformed bidders bid. This price must be
weakly below v to guarantee an expected payoﬀ that is weakly above zero. If q = v, then in the
case that there is only one uninformed bidder, this bidder can proﬁtably deviate to some q′ < v.
If q < v then any uninformed bidder can proﬁtably deviate by bidding some q′ = q + ǫ for an
epsilon small enough. This guarantees virtually the same ex-post payoﬀ as bidding q but with a
higher probability, as the bidder avoids the ties that may occur by bidding q.
14It is enough that the expected payoﬀ form the information acquisition is less than the ex-
pected payoﬀ from the uninformed bidding.
14start by assuming that the mixing by the uninformed takes place on the interval
[˜ p, ˆ p] such that ˜ p = β(v) and ˆ p = ˆ β(v) according to the distribution function J(·).
The uninformed bidders’ expected payoﬀ is equal to
V =
≡G(p)
        
qF(v) + (1 − q)J(p)
 n−1
(v − p),
for all p ∈ [˜ p, ˆ p]. The uninformed bidders’ mixed strategy satisﬁes J(p) = 0 for
p ≤ ˜ p and J(ˆ p) = 1. This information allows us to determine J(·) to be
J(b) =
 









Since J(ˆ p) = 1 we get that
 





v − ˜ p
v − ˆ p
 
.


























Substituting J(·) into G(·) we get that
G(b) =






Now let’s check that none of the informed bidders want to bid p ∈ [˜ p, ¯ p]. The
expected payoﬀ for bidder with type θ from bidding p ∈ [˜ p, ¯ p] is
G(b)(θ − p) =






If the valuation θ = v, the expected utility is constant for all p ∈ [˜ p, ˆ p]. If the
valuation θ > v the expected utility increases with p implying that the bidder
wants to bid more than ˆ p = ˆ β(v). If the valuation θ < v the expected utility
decreases with p implying that the bidder wants to bid less than ˜ p = β(v).
Since the uninformed bidders do not acquire information their ”valuation” is
essentially v. Therefore, they do not want to bid above ˆ p, since this is the optimal
bid for the bidder of type v. Similarly they do not want to bid below ˜ p since this
is the optimal bid for the bidder of type v when all other bidders are informed and
have valuations below v. ￿
We now formalize our assumption that the uninformed bidders do not acquire
information in the FPA. The expected payoﬀ for an uninformed bidder from infor-




G(x)(x − βFPA(x))f(x)dx +
  ¯ θ
v















(qF(y) + 1 − q)n−1dy − ˆ K
 
f(x)dx − c.
15Now by the monotone convergence theorem we have that as n → ∞ the expected
revenue tends to −ˆ K(1 − F(v)) − c ≤ 0.
Lemma 3. For all c > 0 and q > 0 there exist m ∈ N such that if n ≥ m then
R < 0.
The Dutch auction equilibrium with uninformed bidders. In this section
we go through the equilibrium derivation that we refer to in the discussion follow-
ing the equilibrium strategies. Here the assumption that information acquisition
is always preferred to staying uninformed is relaxed.15 In this case the bidders
can be divided into three categories: The bidders that are initially informed, the
uninformed bidders who decide to acquire information during the auction and the
uninformed bidders who choose to bid without information acquisition. The se-
quencing of events in this case is the following:
• The nature chooses which bidders are informed with probability q
• The uninformed bidders randomize their decision to acquire information
or to remain uninformed. We deﬁne by σ the probability that an initially
uninformed bidder acquires information.
• The auction starts and the bidders abide by their strategies.
In this case the equilibrium behavior in the auction consists of ﬁve phases:
At phase 1 no information acquisition takes place and only initially informed
bidders with high valuations bid
At phase 2 some uninformed acquire information and bid if they observe
that their valuation is above a threshold w∗. Information acquisition takes
place over an interval of prices [p, ¯ p].
At phase 3 no information acquisition takes place and the informed bidders
compete by bidding according a common bid function.
At phase 4 the still uninformed bidders bid by randomizing their bids over
an interval of prices [r, ¯ r].
At phase 5 all bidders are informed and have valuations below v. Bidding
is conducted in a similar fashion as in the ﬁrst price sealed bid auction.
To start let us recall assumption 1 which is still assumed to hold:
Assumption 1. The information acquisition cost c > 0 satisﬁes
c < ua(v). (7)
It is useful to simplify notation by (re)deﬁning the following distribution func-
tions:
˜ G(θ) = (qF(θ) + 1 − q)n−1 for θ ≥ w∗
ˆ G(θ) =
 
F(θ)(q + (1 − q)σ) + (1 − q)(1 − σ)
 n−1
for v ≤ θ < w∗
G∗(θ) = (F(θ)(q + (1 − q)σ)
n−1 for θ < v.
The interpretation of the probability ˜ G(·) is as before. At the ﬁrst phase either
the informed bidders have valuations below θ (with probability qF(θ) ) or the other
bidders are uninformed (with probability 1 − q).
15Let us recall that the condition for the information acquisition to be a desirable option in




0 G(y)F(y)dy is satisﬁed
16The events leading to probability ˆ G(·) in the third phase are the following: Either
the competing bidders are informed (initially or have acquired information) and
have a valuations below θ (with probability F(θ)(q + (1 −q)σ)) or they decided to
stay uninformed (with probability (1 − q)(1 − σ)).
Finally the only way to reach the ﬁfth phase is that all bidders are informed
(either initially or eventually acquired information) and have valuations below θ
(with probability F(θ)(q + (1 − q)σ).
Again let us deﬁne




˜ G(ˆ θ)(θ − ˜ β(ˆ θ)), for ˆ θ ≥ w∗
ˆ G(ˆ θ)(θ − ˆ β(ˆ θ)), for ˆ θ ∈ (v,w∗)
G∗(ˆ θ)(θ − β∗(ˆ θ)), for ˆ θ < v
as the utility of an informed bidder with valuation θ that behaves like an informed
with a valuation ˆ θ. Also deﬁne U(θ) = u(θ,θ). For θ < v the bidding strategy
is fully determined by U(0) = 0 and for θ ≥ v the bid functions are determined
up to a constant K1,K2. It is straightforward to derive and check the incentive
compatibility for the bidding functions.
˜ β(θ) =
  θ
0 x˜ g(x)dx + K2
˜ G(θ)
,if θ ≥ w∗
ˆ β(θ) =
  θ
0 xˆ g(x)dx + K1
ˆ G(θ)





,if θ < v.
Let’s then turn to the uninformed bidders bidding at phase 4. The expected
payoﬀ of the uninformed bidder who decides to bid blind-folded at the price p ∈
(r, ¯ r) is
V (p) =
 
F(v)(q + (1 − q)σ) + (1 − q)(1 − σ)J(p)
 n−1
(v − p),
where J(·) denotes the mixed strategy distribution for the uninformed bidders. Here
the probability that the price descends to p has the following interpretation: Either
all informed bidders have valuations below v - with probability F(v)(q+(1−q)σ) -
or they are not informed and have decided to bid at a lower price - with probability
(1 − q)(1 − σ)J(p). Using the fact that J(r) = 0 we get that
V (r) = (F(w)(q + (1 − q)σ))n−1(v − r)
which allows us to solve J(·) and obtain
J(p) =





 F(v)(q + (1 − q)σ)
(1 − q)(1 − σ)
.
Now we need that the indiﬀerence condition be satisﬁed for the bidder with a
valuation v and hence we have that β∗(v) = r. Since J(¯ r) = 1 we can solve for ¯ r.




ˆ G(x) − G∗(x)dx.
Let’s then consider the information acquisition decision by the uninformed. The





  ¯ θ
w
u(θ,w)f(θ)dθ − c ˜ G(w). (8)
In an analogous fashion to the analysis in the main paper we get from the ﬁrst
order condition for equation (8) that16
  ¯ θ
w
(θ − w)f(θ)dθ = c. (9)
The uninformed that acquires information optimally at β(w∗) gets
E[min{U(θ),U(w∗)}] + ˜ G(w∗)
   ˆ θ
w∗
(θ − w∗)f(θ)dθ − c
 
= E[min{U(θ),U(w∗)}].
Now the information acquisition starts at ¯ p = ˜ β(w∗) and it must also end at some
p. Again by the indiﬀerence condition for type w∗ we have that p = ˆ β(w∗). We
next need to ﬁnd an information acquisition strategy that ensures that information
acquisition at any price on (p, ¯ p) yields E[min{U(θ),U(w∗)}].








F(w∗)(q + (1 − q)σ) + (1 − q)σ(1 − F(w∗)) ˆ H(p)) + (1 − q)(1 − σ))
 
is composed of three events. Either the uninformed is faced with an (initially)
informed bidders with θ ≤ w∗ - with probability F(w∗)(q +(1−q)σ - or with unin-
formed bidders that have valuations θ > w∗ but who have not acquired information
yet - with probability (1 − q)σ(1 − F(w∗)) ˆ H(p). Finally the bidders may be unin-
formed and decided not to acquire information - with probability (1 − q)(1 − σ).
Equating (10) with E[min{U(θ),U(w∗)}] we can solve for ˆ H(·) and obtain
ˆ H(p) =
qF(w∗) + 1 − q
(1 − q)σ(1 − F(w∗))





F(w∗)(q + (1 − q)σ) − (1 − q)(1 − σ)
(1 − q)σ(1 − F(w∗))
.
(11)
Using the fact that H(p) = 0 and p = ˆ β(w∗) we can solve for ¯ p and get
¯ p =









∂wu(θ,w) = (θ − w) ˜ G′(w).
18Finally the indiﬀerence condition ˜ β(w∗) = ¯ p allows us to pin down the constant of











We have just constructed the equilibrium strategies. It remains to check the
incentives. The informed incentives need be checked in phases 2 and 4 where the
uninformed use their mixed strategy. Also the uninformed bidders’ incentives for
information acquisition need to be checked. Finally we need to check that the
uninformed get the same expected utility from information acquisition and bidding
without acquiring any information.
Lemma 4. The informed have no proﬁtable deviations in phase 4, p ∈ (r, ¯ r).
Proof. The expected payoﬀ for an informed bidder in phase 4 is given by
(F(v)(q + (1 − q)σ) + (1 − q)(1 − σ)J(p)
 n−1
(θ − p) =
 
F(v)(q + (1 − q)σ)
 n−1v − r
v − p
(θ − p).
Here it is clear that this utility is constant for θ = v. U is also increasing in p if
θ > v and decreasing in p if θ < v. ￿
Lemma 5. The informed have no proﬁtable deviations in phase 2, p ∈ (p, ¯ p).
Proof. The expected payoﬀ for an informed bidder in phase 2 is given by
R(p)n−1(θ − p) =
 
qF(w∗) + 1 − q
 n−1w∗ − ¯ p
w∗ − p
(θ − p).
Here it is clear that this utility is constant for θ = w∗. U is also increasing in p if
θ > w∗ and decreasing in p if θ < w∗. ￿
Lemma 6. The uninformed have no proﬁtable deviations in phases 1 or 3.
Proof. Almost analogously to the proof in the main text. Suppose that θ′ < w∗.
Then using equation (2) and the deﬁnition of c allows us to compute
W(w∗) − W(θ′) =
  w∗
θ′
U(θ) − u(θ,θ′)f(θ)dθ +




  ¯ θ
w∗










19Then assuming that θ′ > w∗ we get that










  ¯ θ
θ′
u(θ,θ′)f(θ)dθ +




  ¯ θ
w∗













(θ − w∗) ˜ G(θ
′)f(θ)dθ
+
  ¯ θ
θ′
(U(w∗) − u(w∗,θ′)f(θ)dθ ≥ 0.
The inequality holds by an analogous argument as was presented in the main text.
￿
Consider then the diﬀerence between the expected utilities of the uninformed
bidders and of the bidders who acquire information.




   w∗
0
U(θ)f(θ)dθ +
  ¯ θ
w∗





G∗(x)dx(F(w∗) + (1 − F(w∗))
−








































ˆ G(x)(1 − F(x))dx,
where we have integrated the terms
   
G(y)dyf(x)dx by parts and cancelled some
terms. For the construction it is suﬃcient to show that we can ﬁnd σ such that the
diﬀerence is zero. This is not always the case. It is instructive to study how this

















(1 − F(x))2 ˆ Y (x)n−2dx
 
(n − 1)(1 − q) ≥ 0,
where Y (x) = F(x)(q + (1 − q)σ) and ˆ Y (x) = F(x)(q + (1 − q)σ) + (1 − q)(1 − σ).
Then consider the diﬀerence in the limits as q goes either to 0 or 1. When q = 0
20we ﬁnd that
V − W =
q=0 and σ=0
−v(F(w∗) − F(v)) −
  w∗
v
(1 − F(x))dx < 0.
Now consider the diﬀerence when either q or σ goes to 1.








where the inequality follows from the fact that assumption 2 is relaxed. However
the diﬀerence cannot be pushed to change sign in all cases.17 In this case the
equilibrium behavior corresponds to the one derived in the case of the ﬁrst price
auction.
To see this suppose the parameters are such that for all σ ∈ [0,1] the equation
(12) holds as V −W ≥ 0. Then consider the case σ = 0. Notice that this limit case
is equivalent to the setting for the FPA. One can easily check that the distribution
functions G∗(·) = G(·) and ˆ G(·) = ˜ G(·). Also the uninformed bidders get in
expectation the same expected payoﬀ as in the FPA case. Of course in this case
the derivation for the information acquisition is unnecessary. The most relevant
point is that the incentives to stay uninformed are satisﬁed since the equation (12)
is positive when σ = 0.
Thus we have that when for all σ ∈ [0,1] equation (12) is positive the Dutch
auction equilibrium is equivalent to the FPA equilibrium. If the equation (12) is
negative for all σ ∈ [0,1] the Dutch auction equilibrium is the one derived in the
main text of this paper, where all bidders acquire information during the infor-
mation acquisition phase. Finally if it is the case that for some σ ∈ (0,1) the
equation (12) equals zero, then the equilibrium derived here is obtained. I.e. some
uninformed bidders may opt to stay uninformed and place bids blind-folded by
randomizing over [r, ¯ r].
As a ﬁnal remark we show that for σ = 1 we have that V −W ≤ 0 as n becomes
large. To see this we write the inequality as
  w∗
v




Now both these terms converge to zero when n approaches inﬁnity. Consider the
rate of convergence of the ﬁrst term. This is equal to
  w∗
v G(x)(1 − F(x))(F(x) − 1)dx
  w∗
v G(x)(1 − F(x))dx
≥
  w∗
v G(x)(1 − F(x))(F(v) − 1)dx
  w∗
v G(x)(1 − F(x))dx
= (F(v) − 1).
The rate of convergence of the second term satisﬁes
  v





0 G(x)F(x)(F(v) − 1)dx
  v
0 G(x)F(x)dx
= (F(v) − 1),
which implies that for n large enough the inequality holds.
Bank of Finland, P.O. Box 160, FI-00101 HELSINKI, FINLAND
E-mail address: paavo.miettinen@bof.fi
17The diﬀerence V −W remains positive for all σ ∈ [0,1] in the case of a uniform distribution
for parameter values c = 0.1, n = 3, q = 0.99 and v = 0.5.
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